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Abstract—In this work, we propose a new channel training
(CT) scheme to enhance physical layer security in a full-
duplex wiretap channel, where the multi-antenna and full-
duplex receiver simultaneously receives the information signal
and transmits artificial noise (AN). In order to suppress the
self-interference caused by AN, the receiver has to estimate
the self-interference channel prior to the data communication
phase. In the proposed CT scheme, the receiver transmits limited
pilot symbols which are known only to itself, which prevents
the eavesdropper from estimating the jamming channel from
the receiver to the eavesdropper, hence effectively degrades the
eavesdropping capability. Compared with the traditional CT
scheme that uses publicly known pilots, the newly proposed
secret CT scheme offers significantly better performance when
the number of antennas at the eavesdropper is larger than one,
e.g., NE > 1. The optimal power allocation between CT and
data/AN transmission at the legitimate transmitter/receiver is
determined for the proposed secret CT scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security is emerging as a promising technique
to realize and enhance the secrecy of wireless communications
and is also compatible and complementary to the traditional
cryptographic techniques [1]. In the pioneering studies of
physical layer security (e.g., [2]), a wiretap channel was
established as the fundamental model to characterize physical
layer security, in which an eavesdropper (Eve) attempts to
intercept the data transmission between a transmitter (Alice)
and a legitimate receiver (Bob). In the context of multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, artificial
noise (AN)-aided secure transmission is of growing interesting
due to its robustness and desirable performance (e.g., [3–7]).
As a result of the full-duplex techniques coming to reality
[8], AN was proposed to be transmitted by a full-duplex
receiver that can simultaneously receive an information signal
and transmit AN to enhance physical layer security (e.g., [9–
14]). We refer to the wiretap channel with a full-duplex Bob
as the full-duplex wiretap channel.
One of the key challenges faced in designing practical
full-duplex transceivers is self-interference and thus many
techniques have been developed in the literature to suppress
the self-interference [8]. Among the different types of self-
interference cancellation techniques, the channel-aware tech-
nique has attracted increasing research interests since it is
normally the last line of defense against self-interference
in the digital domain [8]. In channel-aware self-interference
cancellation, the channel state information (CSI) of the self-
interference channel (i.e., the channel between the transmit and
receive antennas of a full-duplex transceiver) is first estimated
and then the self-interference is suppressed by beamforming
or subtraction. However, how to perform the self-interference
channel estimation and how to allocate transmit power be-
tween the channel training (CT) and data transmission have
not been addressed in the context of physical layer security.
The assumption that the CSI of the self-interference channel
is perfectly known is widely adopted in the literature and
thus the self-interference can be fully cancelled [9]. This
assumption cannot be justified in many practical scenarios
in which the self-interference channel consists of not only
deterministic direct paths but also random reflected paths from
nearby scatterers. This partially motivates this work, which, for
the first time, examines CT in the full-duplex wiretap channel.
The assumption that Eve knows the CSI of the jamming
channel (i.e., the channel between Bob’s transmit antennas
and Eve) in the full-duplex wiretap channel is adopted in the
literature (e.g., [9, 14]). This assumption ignores one property
of the full-duplex wiretap channel, which is that Bob knows
exactly the signals he transmits. This means that the pilots
used to estimate the self-interference channel are not required
to be public. The ignorance of this property in the literature
leads to the fact that the benefits of transmitting AN by a
full-duplex Bob rather than an external jammer have not been
fully exploited. Therefore, our work explores this property
to redesign CT in order to enhance physical layer security.
We develop, for the first time, a new secret CT scheme
based on this property. Specifically, secret pilots are utilized
to estimate the self-interference channel in limited symbol
periods in order to avoid Eve obtaining the CSI of the jamming
channel. In order to maximize the connection probability (CP)
subject to a maximum allowable secrecy outage probability
(SOP), we determine the optimal transmit power allocation
between CT and data/AN transmission at Alice and Bob under
average power constraints. Our study show that our proposed
secret CT scheme significantly outperforms the traditional CT
scheme (which utilizes publicly known pilots to estimate the
self-interference channel) when NE > 1, where NE is the
number of antennas at Eve. The performance advantage of
our proposed secret CT scheme increases as NE increases. We
further find that the secret CT scheme obtains the same secrecy
performance as the traditional CT scheme when NE = 1.
Fig. 1. The full-duplex wiretap channel of interest.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
The full-duplex wiretap channel of interest is illustrated in
Fig. 1, where Alice is equipped with a single antenna, Bob is
equipped with NB full-duplex antennas, and Eve is equipped
with NE antennas. We assume that Bob operates in the full-
duplex mode (i.e., all NB antennas are used for reception and
transmission simultaneously). We denote h ∈ CNB×1 as the
main channel vector, denote g ∈ CNE×1 as the channel vector
between Alice and Eve (referred to as the eavesdropper’s
channel), denote Gj ∈ C
NE×NB as the jamming channel
matrix, and denote Hs ∈ C
NB×NB as the self-interference
channel matrix. We assume all the wireless channels within
our system model are subject to independent quasi-static
Rayleigh fading with equal block length1. We further assume
that the entries of h, g, Gj , and Hs are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables with zero-mean. We adopt the
assumption that the variance of each entry in h, g, and Gj is
normalized to one, but the variance of each entry in Hs is σ
2
s .
This assumption is to keep the generality of these channels,
since the fading variances (including path loss) of h, g, and
Gj can be effectively absorbed into the noise variance at Bob
and the transmit powers of Alice and Bob, while the fading
variance of Hs is quantified by σ
2
s .
We assume that the total duration of each block consists of
T symbol periods, including pilot and data symbols. In the
pilot symbol periods, Alice and Bob send pilots to enable the
estimation of the main channel and the self-interference chan-
nel, respectively. The pilots used by Alice is publicly known.
In the data symbol periods, Alice transmits confidential infor-
mation to Bob while the full-duplex Bob sends AN to aid this
secure transmission. We denote Alice’s transmit powers for
pilots and data by PAp and PAd, respectively. We also denote
Bob’s transmit powers for pilots and AN by PBp and PBa,
1The self-interference channel considered throughout this work is the
effective self-interference channel after channel-unaware interference cancel-
lation. Based on [8] we know that the deterministic components in the self-
interference channel can be removed through channel-unaware interference
cancellation and thus it is reasonable to assume the self-interference channel
after the channel-unaware cancellation is subject to independent quasi-static
Rayleigh fading.
respectively. We consider an average power constraint over
a fading block [15], in which the total energy for a fading
block at Alice and/or Bob is subject to a fixed upper bound.
We also consider the passive eavesdropping scenario, in which
Alice does not know the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel.
In practice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know the noise
at Eve. As such, we adopt the worst-case scenario where the
noise at Eve is zero, which is widely used in the literature
(e.g., [4]).
B. Transmission Strategy and Performance Metrics
In the data symbol periods, Alice adopts a fixed-rate wiretap
code that can be described using two rate parameters, namely,
the codeword rate RB and the redundancy rate RE , which are
predetermined and fixed [16]. The actual information rate is
given by RB − RE . For such a transmission scheme, Bob
cannot reliability decode the transmitted information when
the capacity of the main channel is less than RB , while
perfect secrecy against Eve fails when the capacity of the
eavesdropper’s channel is larger than RE [16]. We refer to
the probability of achieving reliable decoding as CP and refer
to the probability of failing to achieve perfect secrecy as
SOP. The CP and SOP exist for the considered full-duplex
wiretap channel due to channel estimation errors. The CP is the
probability that Bob can decode the message for a given RB
with a negligible decoding error probability, which is given by
Pc=Pr(log2(1 + γB)≥RB). (1)
Likewise, the SOP is the probability that the capacity of the
eavesdropper’s channel is less than RE , which is given by
Pso = Pr (log(1 + γE) > RE) . (2)
As mentioned above, data transmission in the considered
full-duplex wiretap channel may incur connection and secrecy
outages. Considering block fading channels, we adopt the
effective throughput subject to a given secrecy constraint as
our key performance metric, which is given by [16]
η =
T−NB−1
T
(RB−RE)Pc, (3)
s.t. Pso ≤ ǫ,
where ǫ is the maximum allowable SOP (i.e., the predeter-
mined secrecy requirement of the system). We note that in
this work T , RB , and RE are a priori determined. As such,
the maximization of η subject to Pso ≤ ǫ is equivalent to the
following optimization
maxPc, s.t. Pso ≤ ǫ. (4)
III. SECRET CHANNEL TRAINING SCHEME
In the full-duplex wiretap channel, the pilots sent by Bob to
estimate the self-interference channel can be kept secret to Eve
(i.e., the pilots are secret and unknown to Eve). This is due to
the fact that Bob knows exactly what he transmits and thus it
is not necessary to a priori share his pilots with other devices
to conduct the self-interference channel estimation. As such,
in this section we develop a specific CT strategy dedicated to
the full-duplex wiretap channel, which is named as the secret
CT scheme.
A. Secret Channel Training
In this secret CT scheme, we first set TB = NB , where
TB is the number of symbol periods used to estimate the self-
interference channel Hs. This assumption is to guarantee a
reliable estimate of Hs at Bob according to the principle of
the Linear Minimum Mean Square Error (LMMSE) estimation
(i.e., if TB < NB Bob cannot achieve a reliable estimate of
Hs) [17]. We note that TB = NB is also a hard requirement
for the secret CT scheme since when TB > NB Eve can obtain
partial information about the jamming channel Gj through
blind channel estimation [18] even though she does not know
the pilots sent by Bob. Setting TB = NB guarantees that
the estimation problem of Gj at Eve is ill-posed due to the
unknown pilots (from the signal processing point of view),
and thus Eve cannot achieve any information about Gj in the
secret CT scheme.
To enable Bob to estimate the main channel, Alice transmits
its publicly known pilots. We note that Alice and Bob have to
transmit pilots in different symbol periods in order to achieve
orthogonality between Alice’s and Bob’s pilots, due to the
constraint TB = NB . In this work, we set the number of
symbol periods used to estimate the main channel to be 1 since
Alice is equipped with a single antenna. We note that prior
studies on optimal training resource allocation have shown
that the optimal number of pilot equals the number of transmit
antennas (which is NB for the self-interference channel and 1
for the main channel in this work), under the average power
constraint [15].
When Alice transmits the pilot, the corresponding received
signal at Bob is given by zA =
√
PAphsA + wB , where
zA ∈ C
NB×1, sA ∈ C
1×1 is the pilot transmitted by Alice
satisfying sAs
†
A = 1, and wB ∈ C
NB×1 is the noise at
Bob with i.i.d entries, each of which follows the distribution
CN (0, σ2B). Considering the LMMSE estimator, based on the
known pilot Bob achieves the estimate of h as [17]
hˆ =
√
PAp
PAp + σ2B
zAs
†
A. (5)
Based on the properties of LMMSE [17], the entries of hˆ
are i.i.d and each of them follows the distribution CN (0, σ2
hˆ
),
where
σ2
hˆ
=
PAp
PAp + σ2B
. (6)
Again, due to the properties of LMMSE, the estimation error
h˜ = h− hˆ is independent of hˆ and the entries of h˜ are i.i.d,
each of which follows the distribution CN (0, σ2
h˜
), where
σ2
h˜
=
σ2B
PAp + σ2B
. (7)
Since Alice’s pilot is publicly known, Eve can obtain perfect
CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel g in the worst-case scenario
(i.e., when the receive noise at Eve is zero).
When Bob transmits pilots over NB symbol periods with his
NB full-duplex antennas, the signal at his receive antennas is
given by ZB =
√
PBpHsSB +WB , where ZB ∈ C
NB×NB ,
SB ∈ C
NB×NB are the pilots transmitted by Bob satisfying
SBS
†
B = INB , and WB ∈ C
NB×NB is the noise at Bob with
i.i.d entries, each of which follows the distribution CN (0, σ2B).
Again, adopting the LMMSE estimator (based on the known
SB and σ
2
s ) Bob obtains the estimate of Hs as
Hˆs =
√
PBpσ
2
s
PBpσ2s + σ
2
B
ZBS
†
B . (8)
Likewise, the estimation error H˜s = Hs − Hˆs is indepen-
dent of Hˆs and each of its entries follows the distribution
CN (0, σ2
H˜
), where
σ2
H˜
=
σ2Bσ
2
s
PBpσ2s + σ
2
B
. (9)
When Bob transmits the pilots SB , the received signal
matrix at Eve in the worst-case scenario is given by
ZE =
√
PBpGjSB . (10)
We note ZE ∈ C
NE×NB and in order to prevent Eve from
achieving any information on Gj we have to guarantee
NE ≤ NB . Otherwise (i.e., if NE > NB), Eve can learn
the null space of Gj through performing a singular value
decomposition (SVD) on ZE and this null space can be
utilized to cancel the AN transmitted by Bob. As such, the
secrecy CT scheme requires NE ≤ NB . We would like to
highlight that this requirement is solely due to the considered
worst-case scenario where the noise at Eve is zero. This
requirement has also to be met in the traditional CT scheme
(e.g., [4]).
B. Data Transmission with AN following Secret CT
In the data symbol periods, Alice transmits a data stream
while Bob transmits AN to confuse Eve. In addition to
Eve, the AN also causes interference to Bob through the
self-interference channel due to channel estimation errors. In
general, Bob has two strategies to suppress such interference
based on the estimated self-interference channel Hˆs. First, Bob
can subtract the known part of AN based on Hˆs at his receive
antennas since Bob knows AN he transmits. Second, Bob can
transmit AN in the null space of Hˆs, which leads to the fact
that AN that lies in the null space of Hˆs does not cause any
interference to Bob. We note that the second approach requires
that the number of Bob’s transmit antennas is greater than that
of his receive antennas, which is not satisfied in our system
model. Therefore, in this work we assume that Bob adopts the
first strategy to suppress the interference caused by the AN.
The received signal at Bob in each data symbol period is
given by
yB =
√
PAdhx+
√
PBa
NB
Hsn+ vB , (11)
=
√
PAd(hˆ+h˜)x+
√
PBa
NB
(Hˆs+H˜s)n+vB , (12)
where x ∈ C1×1 denotes the transmitted signal satisfying
E[|x|2] = 1, n ∈ CNB×1 is the AN vector, whose entries are
i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex normal random variables
with zero mean and unit variance, and vB ∈ C
NB×1 is the
noise vector at Bob with i.i.d entries, each of which follows the
distribution CN (0, σ2B). Knowing Hˆs and n, Bob can remove
Hˆsn from yB and obtain the effective received signal as
y′B =
√
PAdhˆx+
√
PAdh˜x+
√
PBa
NB
H˜sn+ vB . (13)
Although Bob knows that his received signal is subject to
the interference caused by the channel estimation errors in
h and Hs, he cannot suppress such interference since he
does not know h˜ and H˜s. As such, the optimal combining
technique that maximizes the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at Bob is maximum ratio combining (MRC)
based on hˆ (since the entries of hˆ, h˜, Hˆs, H˜s are independent),
which leads to the instantaneous SINR at Bob as
γB =
µB‖hˆ‖
2
µB |hˆ†h˜|2
‖hˆ‖2
+ µS‖hˆ
†H˜s‖2
NB‖hˆ‖2
+ 1
, (14)
where µB = PAd/σ
2
B and µS = PBa/σ
2
B .
Likewise, the received signal at Eve in one data symbol
period is given by
yE =
√
PAdgx+
√
PBa
NB
Gjn. (15)
Although Eve knows that her received signal is subject to
the interference caused by the AN, she cannot suppress such
interference since she does not know Gj as discussed in
Section II-B. As such, the optimal combining technique that
maximizes the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) at Eve is
MRC based on the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel g.
Following (15) and applying MRC, the SIR at Eve for the
secret CT scheme is given by
γE =
PAdNB
PBa
‖g‖2∥∥∥g†Gj‖g‖
∥∥∥2
. (16)
C. Traditional Channel Training Scheme as a Benchmark
In order to better illustrate the benefits of the secret CT
scheme, we now consider the traditional CT scheme as a
benchmark. Unlike the secret CT scheme, in the traditional
CT scheme the pilot transmitted by Bob (i.e., SB) is pub-
licly known, which can be jointly designed with the pilot
transmitted by Alice (i.e., sA). As such, in the traditional CT
scheme we do not need the constraint TB = NB because
Bob’s pilots are known by Eve anyway. Hence, Alice and
Bob can simultaneously transmit pilots over 1 + NB symbol
periods while still ensuring the orthogonality of their pilots.
This setting also guarantees a fair comparison between the
secret CT scheme and the traditional CT scheme, since the
total number of symbol periods allocated to CT is 1 +NB in
both schemes. Therefore, σ2
hˆ
, σ2
h˜
, and σ2
H˜
(which are given by
(6), (7), and (9), respectively, in the secret CT scheme) for the
traditional CT scheme should be updated accordingly.
In the traditional CT scheme, the pilot SB is public and thus
Eve can obtain perfect CSI for the jamming channel Gj in the
worst-case scenario (where the noise at Eve is zero). Since Eve
knows that her received signal is subject to the interference
caused by the AN transmitted by Bob, the optimal combining
technique that maximizes the SIR at Eve is MMSE based on
g and Gj . Following (15) and applying the MMSE combiner,
for the traditional CT scheme the instantaneous SIR at Eve is
given by
γE =
PAdNB
PBa
g†
(
GjG
†
j
)−1
g. (17)
We note that (17) is only valid when GjG
†
j is invertible.
Otherwise, Eve can perfectly cancel the interference caused
by AN and thus the SIR given in (17) approaches infinity. As
such, the traditional CT scheme does also require NE ≤ NB
in order to guarantee interference at Eve (e.g., [4]).
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION WITHIN THE SECRET
CHANNEL TRAINING SCHEME
In this section, we determine the optimal transmit power
allocation between CT and data/AN transmission at Alice and
Bob under average power constraints in order to maximize the
CP for a maximum allowable SOP.
In this work, we consider the average power constraint
at both Alice and Bob. Following (4) the power allocation
optimization for the secret CT scheme can be presented as
max
PAp,PAd,PBp,PBa
Pc, (18)
s.t. Pso ≤ ǫ, (19)
PAp + PAd(T −NB − 1) ≤ EA, (20)
PBpNB + PBa(T −NB − 1) ≤ EB , (21)
where EA and EB are the total powers available at Alice and
Bob for each block of T symbol periods (hence, the average
power constraints per symbol for Alice and Bob are EA/T
and EB/T ), respectively. We next detail how to determine the
solution to (18) (i.e., the optimal values of PAd, PAp, PBa,
and PBp) in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal value of PAd that maximizes Pc
subject to the constraints given in (19), (20), and (21) can be
obtained through
P∗Ad = argmax
0<PAd<PmAd
Pc(P
†
Ap,PAd,P
†
Bp,P
†
Ba), (22)
where
PmAd = min
{
EA
T −NB − 1
,
EB
τ∗(T −NB − 1)
}
, (23)
P†Ap = EA − PAd(T −NB − 1), (24)
P†Ba = τ
∗PAd, (25)
P†Bp =
EB − τ
∗PAd(T −NB − 1)
NB
, (26)
and τ∗ can be obtained by solving the following equation
Pso(τ
∗) = ǫ. (27)
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Fig. 2. The maximum connection probability of the secret CT scheme versus
the secrecy constraint ǫ for different values of NB and NE , where RB = 5,
RE = 3, T = 300, EA/T = EB/T = 10dB, σ
2
s = 1, and σ
2
B
= 1.
Then, the optimal values of PAp, PBa, and PBp are functions
of P∗Ad given as follows
P∗Ap = EA − P
∗
Ad(T −NB − 1), (28)
P∗Ba = τ
∗P∗Ad, (29)
P∗Bp =
EB − τ
∗P∗Ad(T −NB − 1)
NB
. (30)
Proof: We first note that both Pso and Pc are both
monotonically decreasing functions of PBa (since as shown
in (14) and (16) both γB and γE decrease as PBa increases).
As such, Pso = ǫ is always achieved in order to maximize
Pc subject to the secrecy constraint (19). Otherwise (i.e., if
Pso < ǫ), we can decrease PBa to increase Pc. Following (16),
we note that Pso only depends on the ratio of PBa to PAd
(i.e., τ ) but not the specific values of PBa or PAd. As such,
we can obtain τ∗ through solving (27). As per τ = PBa/PAd,
we obtain (25). We also note that Pso is not a function of PAp
or PBp as per (16), while Pc monotonically increases as PAp
or PBp increases as per (14). Then, we can conclude that the
equality in both (20) and (21) is always guaranteed, which
leads to (24) and (26), respectively. Finally, (23) is achieved
due to PAp > 0 and PBp > 0.
By substituting P∗Ad, P
∗
Ap, P
∗
Ba, and P
∗
Bp into (1), we can
obtain the maximum CP of the secret CT scheme.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to examine the
secrecy performance of the proposed secret CT scheme with
the traditional CT scheme as the benchmark.
In Fig. 2 we plot the maximum CP of the secret CT scheme
versus the secrecy constraint indicator ǫ for different values of
NB and NE . We first observe that as ǫ increases the maximum
CP increases, which demonstrates the tradeoff between the
effective throughput and the secrecy constraint. For example,
ǫ
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Fig. 3. Alice’s optimal data transmit power P∗
Ad
versus the secrecy constraint
ǫ for different values of NB and NE , where RB = 5, RE = 3, T = 300,
σ2s = 1, EA/T = EB/T = 10dB, and σ
2
B
= 1.
by comparing the values of the maximum CP for ǫ = 0.01 and
ǫ = 0.15 we can see that the cost in terms of the reduction
in the maximum CP to achieve secrecy is significant. We also
observe that the maximum CP decreases as NE increases or
NB decreases, which is mainly due to the fact that the SOP
increases as NE increases or NB decreases.
Under the same settings of Fig. 2, we plot Alice’s optimal
transmit power for data (i.e., P∗Ad) and Bob’s optimal transmit
power for AN (i.e., P∗Ba) versus ǫ in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
respectively. We first observe that P∗Ad increases as ǫ increases
in Fig. 3, which demonstrates that more transmit power is
allocated to data transmission as the secrecy constraint is
relaxed. We also observe that P∗Ba decreases as ǫ increases
in Fig. 4, which demonstrates that as the secrecy constraint
is relaxed less transmit power is allocated to AN at Bob.
These two observations confirm that as ǫ increases the optimal
power ratio τ∗ decreases since the SOP is a monotonically
increasing function of τ . In Fig. 3, we also observe that more
transmit power is allocated to data transmission at Alice as
NE decreases or NB increases. In Fig. 4, we also observe
that less transmit power is allocated to AN at Bob as NE
decreases or NB increases. Overall, we can conclude that more
transmit power is allocated to data transmission at Alice and
less transmit power is allocated to AN at Bob as Eve becomes
weaker or Bob becomes more powerful.
We now consider the scenario where Bob and Eve have the
same number of antennas, i.e., NB = NE = N , to compare
the secrecy performance of the secret and traditional CT
schemes. In Fig. 5 we plot the maximum reliable probabilities
of the secret and traditional CT schemes versus N . In this
figure, we first observe that for N = 1 our proposed secrecy
CT achieves the same maximum CP as the traditional CT
scheme. This can be explained by the fact that the SOP for
the secret CT scheme is the same as that for the traditional CT
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Fig. 4. Bob’s optimal AN transmit power P∗
Ba
versus the secrecy constraint
ǫ for different values of NB and NE , where RB = 5, RE = 3, T = 300,
σ2s = 1, EA/T = EB/T = 10dB, and σ
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= 1.
scheme for N = 1 and the number of symbol periods allocated
to CT in both the secret CT scheme and the traditional CT
scheme is optimal under average power constraints. We also
observe that for N > 1 our proposed secret CT scheme
significantly outperforms the traditional CT scheme in terms
achieving a much higher maximum CP. Specifically, the secret
CT scheme with ǫ = 0.05 even achieves a much higher
maximum CP than the traditional CT scheme with ǫ = 0.1
when N > 1. This is due to the fact that the secret CT scheme
prevents Eve from obtaining the CSI of the jamming channel.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work devised a new secret CT scheme based on the
property of the full-duplex wiretap channel in which Bob
knows exactly what he transmits. Our studies show that when
NE > 1 the secret CT scheme significantly outperforms the
traditional CT scheme in terms of achieving a much higher
CP subject to the same secrecy constraint, and when NE = 1
they achieve the same secrecy performance. The secrecy
performance improvement of the secret CT scheme relative
to the traditional CT scheme increases as NE increases.
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